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1. Introduction 
The nature of the EU economic policy coordination has changed over the last few years, largely 
reflecting the debt crisis and the deep economic problems of the euro area since 2010. The 
European Semester was introduced in parallel with the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure 
(MIP) and a strengthened Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), in the wake of the euro area crisis, 
which started in Greece, and of the global financial crisis of 2008. It aimed at addressing 
problems of large fiscal and other macroeconomic imbalances. Against a backdrop of acute 
tensions in financial markets, it is thus not surprising that attention was focused on the fiscal 
adjustment, which was deemed necessary to re-establish confidence in the sustainability of 
public finances.  
All EU member states participate in the policy coordination cycle framed by the European 
Semester.  However, euro area members, which have surrendered monetary policy as national 
stabilization tool, should be more concerned. They are also the only ones subject to the 
sanctions under the corrective arm of the SGP and the MIP.  
This contribution focuses on the euro area member countries and the euro area as whole. 
As tensions in financial markets started to abate, but growth continued to stall after 2013, 
attention shifted in a marked fashion to the more general issue of how to make economies 
more flexible and productive. The focus of the (national) Country Specific Recommendations 
(CSRs) has followed a similar pattern, reflecting both the urgency to correct certain imbalances 
and to improve the structure of the economy, with different emphasis over time. As is 
illustrated below, in recent years they have also tended to cover additional fields.  
The 2015 European Semester cycle has seen some further changes, which were introduced by 
the new Commission.  In order to streamline the process of economic policy coordination, the 
Commission now publishes the country analyses in advance, already at the beginning of the 
year, to give member states longer time for discussion, including with social partners. For the 
2016 European Semester, it also adjusted the timetable of other steps in order to have more 
time to agree on priorities from European and euro area perspectives (see Figure 1). 
Compared to previous years, the 2015 CSRs focus on fewer, key areas of action, according to 
the priorities identified in the Annual Growth Survey (AGS). This approach is consistent with 
the Europe 2020 objectives and the Commission’s new guidance on the application of the rules 
of the SGP. The underlying objective is to strengthen the link between structural reforms, 
investment, and fiscal responsibility in support of jobs and growth. These broad guidelines 
are then translated into specific recommendations for each country, according to the specific 
needs and situation.1 
                                                   
1 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4975_en.htm  
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Figure 1. Streamlined European Semester 
 
Source: European Commission. 
Compared to previous years, the 2015 CSRs focus on fewer, key areas of action, according to 
the priorities identified in the Annual Growth Survey (AGS). This approach is consistent with 
the Europe 2020 objectives and the Commission’s new guidance on the application of the rules 
of the SGP. The underlying objective is to strengthen the link between structural reforms, 
investment, and fiscal responsibility in support of jobs and growth. These broad guidelines 
are then translated into specific recommendations for each country, according to the specific 
needs and situation.2 
When it comes to the content, the most important novelty of the new CSRs is the emphasis on 
reforms. As it will be argued below, while reforms are necessary and welcome in most 
countries across the Union, not only in those member states most hit by the crisis, the economic 
rationale for coordinating reform policies is weak in ‘normal time’ and their implementation 
will depend on national governments’ assessment of domestic needs. The rate of 
implementation of CSRs tends to be limited and has declined over the last two years. We argue 
that next year will be no different, if anything implementation is likely to be even lower.  
On the question of what can be done, we stress the role that peer pressure can play given that 
the past track record of the Commission and Council to not implement sanctions. Their ability 
to ensure enforcement is therefore uncertain, even more so when it comes to structural reforms 
which do not explicitly fall under MIP and SGP procedures. The president of the Eurogroup 
could exert more pressure. 
                                                   
2 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4975_en.htm  
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We then discuss the Commission’s follow-up to the Five Presidents’ Report, paying particular 
attention to the propositions for the creation of National Competitiveness Boards and the 
advisory European Fiscal Board. While both new institutions seem motivated by the intention 
of increasing the ownership of policies in the respect of EU rules, such set up might end adding 
an extra layer to the already complex governance system, with only very limited effect, if any. 
Against this background, the rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 looks at the 
past track record of implementation of CSRs, focusing on the results of last year, and at the 
main features of the 2015 CSRs. Section 3 looks into the broad issue of structural reforms, 
highlighting how this term has become a ‘generic product’. Section 4 makes some 
considerations about the idea of a European Fiscal Board and the National Competitiveness 
Boards and how they could affect the governance system. Section 5 offers some reflection on 
how the enforcement of the CSRs can be improved and what the president of the Eurogroup 
could do. The last section concludes. 
2. New and old country specific recommendations  
It is by now widely known that the implementation record of the CSRs has been spotty. 
Measuring the degree of implementation of qualitative recommendations like ‘liberalize 
labour markets’ is always imprecise. But all the metrics used to date come to similar results: 
only a fraction of all recommendations is implemented.3 
In 2014, a summary note by the European Parliament4 focussing on the euro area showed that 
implementation has been lower than in 2013. The number of recommendations that recorded 
substantial progress in implementation had slightly decreased from 9% to 6%, and the 
percentage of CSRs that registered no or limited progress has increased from 46 to 49%.  
Figure 2. CSRs 2014, EU-28: implementation assessment 
 
Source: European Parliament (2015). 
If one weights each reform by the size of the country, as it is shown in Figure 3, the picture is 
even less encouraging. The share of CSRs fully implemented falls to 3%. This result is due to 
                                                   
3 Country specific recommendations are divided into three categories, respectively related to the 
Stability and Growth Pact, to the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure, and to the EU 2020 national 
objectives (so called “integrated guidelines”). Policy recommendations regarding fiscal policy fall under 
the objective of meeting SGP rules, and provide numbered targets (MTOs). They can be considered as 
the most quantifiable recommendations because they mention a specific adjustment, but they tend to 
be little specific on the measures needed to attain them. On the other hand, recommendations based on 
the MIP tend to differ greatly, being more or less specific. 
4 www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2015/542649/IPOL_ATA(2015)542649_EN.pdf 
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the fact that it is mainly the small countries which tend to follow the recommendations. No 
large country has fully or substantially implemented its CSRs. 
Figure 3. CSRs 2014, implementation in the euro-area member states, headline (LHS) and weighted 
by GDP (RHS) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on European Parliament (2015). 
A possible reading of it is that large countries tend to avoid full or substantial implementation, 
either by neglecting the recommendations or in most cases by taking marginal action in 
response to them. This is also confirmed by Figure 4 below, which looks at implementation by 
country. 
Figure 4. Implementation of CSRs in 2014 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
There is a large variability in the progress achieved by member states. On the one hand, the 
Netherlands, Latvia, Slovenia, Finland, Portugal, Spain, and Malta have registered at least 
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states like Germany, France and Italy have addressed only between 25% and 50% of the CSRs. 
In general, it seems that the smaller countries are better at implementation. None of the four 
largest euro area countries had recorded substantial progress on any CSRs in 2014. On the 
other hand, Figure 5 shows that it appears that the most distressed countries, as measured by 
their sovereign risk premia, tend to have a stronger implementation record. 
Figure 5. Positive implementation efforts as % of 2014 CSRs and risk premia (2014) 
 
Note: Positive implementation effort is the sum of “some progress” and “substantial/full 
implementation”. Risk premia are annual and measured relative to German 10-year Bund 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Eurostat and European Commission. 
There is also a difference between Eurozone and non-Eurozone EU member states. Indeed, 
while in 2014 at least some progress was made in 61% of the CSRs in euro area countries, non-
euro area countries have only achieved at least some progress in 33% of the recommendations. 
Interestingly, when implementation of CSRs is weighted by respective GDP, the share of CSRs 
where at least some progress is made increased substantially, up from 33 to 64%. This suggests 
that unlike in the euro area, large countries perform better than small countries.  
Figure 6. CSRs 2014, implementation in non-euro-area EU member states, headline (LHS) and 
weighted by GDP (RHS) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on European Parliament (2015). 
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In Annex I, we report the CSRs addressed to Germany and Italy since the first European 
semester exercise in 2011 and their assessment, by year, in some selected areas, namely reforms 
in the service sector, for Germany, and in the service sector, labour market and taxation 
reforms, for Italy. The two countries have received the same kind of recommendations in each 
of these areas every year and, (broadly) every year the Commission’s assessment has been 
“limited progress”. The fact that recommendations tend be similar from one year to the other 
offers two readings. An optimistic one that suggests that small progress would lead to large 
changes over a longer period. A more pessimistic one that suggests that large countries, like 
the two considered, attempt to superficially and formally address broad recommendations, 
without substantial actual changes. Both interpretations are plausible and may hold in 
different areas. This points to the fact that an important limit of CSRs in the framework of the 
European semester is that they have no follow up in terms of monitoring of achievement of 
objectives. 
2.1 The 2015 CSRs 
The 2015 CSRs focussed on 4 priorities.5 
I) Investment to support growth. In order to achieve such objective, barriers to financing 
and launching investment projects have to be removed and the Investment Plan for 
Europe implemented;  
II) Structural reforms in product, service and labour markets that raise productivity, 
competitiveness and investment, as well as in the financial sector to ease access to finance 
for investment and lessen the negative impact of deleveraging in the banking, private 
and public sectors;  
III) Sound fiscal policies that strike a balance between short-term stabilisation and long-term 
sustainability. In member states with weak fiscal position (both deficits and debt) further 
efforts are required to fix their balance sheets, and in member states with fiscal space, 
expansionary stance towards productive investment should be taken. The composition 
of public finances should be designed to make them more supportive to growth;  
IV) Improvement of employment and social protection.  
The 2015 CSRs exhibit some change, at least in the language, compared to previous years. Until 
2013 the main focus of the CSRs had been on sound fiscal policy combined with major labour 
market reforms, especially in countries under financial stress. In 2014 the tone had already 
changed, with much stronger emphasis on growth friendly fiscal consolidation. This year, 
investment and broad reforms are the two main priorities. This seems to signal a shift towards 
a more accommodative stance on fiscal matters.  
This is partially due to the fact that fiscal consolidation has been undertaken by many countries 
since 2011, their public finances are in a much better shape and the pressure coming from the 
markets has reduced substantially. But it may also reflect the new more ‘flexible’ approach of 
the Commission when it comes to the interpretation of the fiscal rules.6 
                                                   
5 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4975_en.htm  
6 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/2015-01-
13_communication_sgp_flexibility_guidelines_en.pdf  
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Figure 7 suggests that most vulnerable countries (those with high public debt and larger 
sovereign spreads) remain the target of the largest number of CSRs, not only fiscal.  
Figure 7. CSRs, risk premia and sovereign debt (2014-15) 
 
Note: the size of the bubble is proportional to public debt-to-GDP ratio. Risk premia 
are annual and measured relative to German 10-year Bund. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on based on Eurostat and European Commission. 
Broadly speaking, reforms and investment seem always desirable7. It is unreasonable to 
oppose reforms that are called to improve funding conditions, boost investment and growth. 
The problem is how to translate these general desiderata into concrete policy action and, in the 
context of the CSRs, it is unclear what role the EU should have. 
On investment, one has to keep in mind that only public investment is under the control of 
governments. The bulk of total investment (in most cases 90% of total investment) is driven by 
market forces. What governments can do is to contribute to build a favourable environment 
to invest. This boils down to reforms ranging from the public administration to simplified 
regulation to financial sector stability. In other words, the first two CSRs are about reforms. 
Next section looks more in depth at structural reforms.  
3. Structural reforms 
Structural reforms seem to get invoked whenever there is a crisis, or limited understanding of 
the policies that can really boost growth and employment. But by being invoked almost as a 
panacea, the term is in danger of losing concrete meaning. This seems to be the case even in 
high level discussion fora of the economic profession.   
Figure 8 shows the frequency of the use of the term structural reforms on two leading websites 
(voxeu.org and Project Syndicate).  
                                                   
7 For a dissenting view see Gros (2014). 
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Figure 8. Structural reforms and economic and policy debate 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on publications on Project Syndicate and VoxEU. 
Of the 300 articles mentioning structural reforms in the euro area8 between 2010 and August 
2015, less than half (120) give a definition or example of desirable reforms, while the rest 
remained vague with no further specification. The figure suggests that the frequency of the 
topic has a certain correlation with the crisis in the euro area, with a pick in 2012, when the 
crisis reached also Italy and Spain; it then slowed down and resumed again in 2015, most likely 
affected by the new Commission guidelines and the emphasis on structural reforms.  
The share of articles without definition or example peaked in 2012, (ca. 60%), but it has 
remained high. Labour market reforms have been and remain still the most mentioned target 
for specific reforms, but tax reforms and public administration have recently become more 
prominent – possibly as consequence of some lessons learned with (the failures of ) the Greek 
programmes. There may also be mounting awareness that even deep and large reforms, which 
are painfully adopted, may fail to deliver if, for instance, the administrative context is poor or 
inefficient.  
Overall the debate has become slightly more specific during the last year, where we have seen 
a more diverse and explicit controversy over avenues of structural reforms. Nevertheless 
structural reforms are still often mentioned offhand, as to stress that financial support for 
struggling economies is dependent on their willingness to reform.  
                                                   
8 Only search results on the website of Vox.eu and Project Syndicate for “Structural reforms” + 
“Eurozone” were taken into account. The search was conduct throughout August 2015. Several articles 
provided many examples of reforms or a wider definition, therefore multiple entries for articles in the 
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Among the specific examples of previous reforms with a positive outcome, the most often 
cited cases are in Sweden in the 1990s and the German labour market reforms in the early 
2000s (Hartz reforms).  
While lessons can be taken from those experiences, their success depends on a constellation of 
factors which may not exist in other countries. Reforms in Sweden after the banking crisis were 
adopted in a context of global growth, which may have helped Sweden substantially. The 
success of the Hartz reforms in Germany may be closely linked to the corporative structure of 
the German production system, largely dominated by the manufacturing. 
If such conditions are crucial for success, other countries adopting similar reforms have little 
chance to deliver similar success. Recent literature9 on reforms suggests that uncertainty is 
high around what makes reforms proposal successful. There are several dimensions, including 
the global economic context (growth versus recession), the institutions of the country under 
consideration, the political context that could be key for success of failure.   
To such uncertainty one should add a specific element of the EU governance system. From 
this perspective, the situation of EMU countries is different from non-euro area member states. 
One general weakness of the European Semester is that it is often difficult to say why the 
Union has an interest in the country undertaking the reforms. This is especially the case for 
countries outside the EMU. When financial market conditions are difficult, one can argue that 
the entire Union can suffer from contagion if any individual country is at risk of severe crisis. 
However, in “normal times”, when this danger seems remote, it is much more difficult to 
argue that the entire Union would gain if any individual country coordinates its policies and 
undertakes, for example, labour market reforms.10 Some reforms are good for the country itself 
(even if moment is low in normal times) and not necessarily coordination leads to a better 
outcome than reforms driven by domestic consideration. In such case, the lack of obvious 
spillovers weakens incentives to coordinate policies ex ante, though not for reforms.  
The rationale for reforms is much stronger from a domestic perspective than from an EU 
perspective, and this is especially true in absence of crisis. The pay-off from reforms is the 
stronger economic performance in the country itself.  If this is the case, the effective pressure 
for reforms coming from outside is much diminished and reforms are likely to proceed 
according to domestic political priorities, whose calendar often conflicts with the various 
stages foreseen by the European semester. 
3.1 Political economy of structural reforms 
In the field of structural reforms, literature seems to suggest that the political economic 
dimension is relevant. In 2009 OECD11 produced a quite comprehensive report on the political 
economy of reforms (pensions, labour and product market), where they look at the experience 
of several countries with different reforms. Among the numerous points, the report stresses 
few aspects which seem critical for the success of reforms. One of the strongest findings of the 
                                                   
9 Among other see Banerji et al. (2015). 
10 The issue of the rationale for economic policy coordination under different conditions (normal times, 
financial crisis, ZLB, etc.) is a very complex issue where literature is still scant. The H2020 research 
project, FIRSTRUN, focuses on this key issue. 
11 OECD (2009), “The political Economy of Reforms. Lessons from pensions, product markets and labour 
markets in ten OECD countries” (www.oecd.org/site/sgemrh/46190166.pdf). 
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report is that it is important to have an electoral mandate for reform. If this is not the case, 
public approval will appear only when the benefits of the reforms materialize, which in most 
cases (especially for large reforms) tend to happen with a large time lag. Time is another key 
issue: reforms need to be prepared, both from a technical and political point of view 
(consultation), and this takes time. This contrasts starkly with the practice of several countries 
in the Union, where momentum for reforms was driven by the crisis and many reforms were 
hastily approved in response to immediate pressure from financial markets.  
There seems to be an inverse relationship between the willingness or pressure to reform and 
the economic cycle. During difficult economic times the need for reforms is most apparent, but 
the economic environment may be most hostile. For example, the need for more flexibility in 
the labour market might be more apparent during a deep downturn. But the cost of flexibility 
in, initially, more firings, will also appear to be higher at that time. During the upswing, the 
converse is often true: a favourable economic climate gives the illusion that reforms are not 
needed, at the time when they might be easier to implement them.  
This seems to apply at European level and in particular with the CSRs. As the business cycle 
improves there is general unwillingness by member states to implement the CSRs.   
It should be said that literature on when economic policy coordination in a monetary union 
leads to a superior outcome is rather scant. From an economic point of view, fiscal policy 
coordination is justified in presence of market failures associated with large cross country 
spillovers effects. These usually emerge in times of crisis, or when policy tools are constrained, 
e.g. zero lower bound. In principle, there is no need for full coordination at any point in time. 
In normal time, coordination should be just a tool for commitment by individual member 
states to certain policy principles and transparent policy setting.12  
Last but not least, successful reform requires persistence. Reforms which are blocked, limited 
or reversed imply high cost both in terms of political capital and future success. 
One task for the President of the Eurogroup would be to combat this broad tendency and try 
to exert pressure for reforms to be implemented even when the domestic political cycle would 
suggest otherwise. 
4. More inclusive and transparent European Semester 
Alcidi et al. (2014) investigate the issue of low degree of both input and output legitimacy of 
the EMU governance, of which the Semester represents a key pillar, and outline the complexity 
of the entire process. Addressing such shortcoming is of crucial importance, but in the current 
institutional set up (no Treaty change) it is very difficult, probably impossible, to achieve 
substantial improvements. The Commission has suggested changes with the objective of 
increasing ownership of reforms, which are in line with the EU system of rules, and improve 
the EU member states mutual understanding of priorities, but there is a significant risk that 
the already complex system will become even more complex.  
                                                   
12.While this issue is of critical importance in the framework of the EU governance, addressing it goes 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
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In fact, such complexity will be increased by two new elements: the stronger emphasis on the 
EU2020 objectives in the CSRs and the new proposals of the Commission to push forward the 
implementation of the Five Presidents Report on Completing the EMU. 
The Commission proposes in particular two innovations13 (see Box 1 for more details): a 
system of National Competitiveness Boards and an advisory European Fiscal Board.  
There might be valid reasons, like inclusiveness and transparency, for both proposed 
innovations, but they risk complicating the European Semester even further.   
The case for National Competitiveness Boards (NCBs) is based on the judgement that this 
approach seems to have worked well in two countries (Belgium and Netherlands) and that it 
might increase the ownership of reforms at the national level. But there is also a risk of 
duplication and overlap, as well as conflict. The purpose of the NCBs is clearly not limited to 
recommending wage increases in line with productivity to avoid losses of competitiveness, 
but to developing a view on reforms needed at the national level to improve productivity and 
other competitiveness indicators. 
The danger of duplication and further complication is apparent in particular in the task 5 
enunciated in Box 1, which would give the national competitiveness board a direct role in the 
European Semester. 
More in general, it is clear that the role of these National Competitiveness Boards in policy 
advice would clearly overlap with the entire process of the European Semester. This means 
that there will be at least one additional instance which will want to make its own contribution. 
Another risk is that the National Competitiveness Board develops a different view of the 
reform agenda than the Commission. The nature and composition of these NCBs will vary 
greatly from country to country and their underlying approach might be very varied.  
Moreover, there are wide differences on the effectiveness of specific reforms even among 
economists sharing the same perspective. This will make it even more difficult to find a 
consensus, leading to less specific CSRs.  For example, during the early 2000s there was a 
heated discussion inside Germany on whether an increase in wages would be good for growth.  
One side held that wages should go up to strengthen domestic demand, whereas the other 
side emphasized that lower wages improves competitiveness and thus exports and indirectly 
employment and growth.  
This example shows not only that there can be legitimate differences of opinion concerning 
wage policy, but also that the NCBs are more likely to take a national point of view.  A gain in 
competitiveness through lower wages by any one country represents a loss for the other 
countries in the euro area.  It is apparent that not all countries can aim at an improvement of 
their wage level relative to the others (in economics this is called the N-1 problem). 
Relative wages (in the form of wage norms) will of course not be the only, hopefully not even 
the main, variable for the NCBs, but this was the case in Belgium, whose experience inspired 
this proposal. 
The advisory European Fiscal Board could represent an additional element of complexity, 
especially concerning the recommendations addressed to the euro area. 
                                                   
13 We do not comment here on the forthcoming proposal to create a system of (re-)insurance of bank 
deposits at the euro area level. This would be a very important step to complete the Banking Union, as 
argued by Gros (2014). 
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A good case can be made for the establishment of such an independent source of opinion and 
advice on fiscal policy based on a systemic, euro area view. But for the purpose of this 
contribution one has to note that this new body could present another source of overlap and 
potential difference of views. If this body, as it seems to be the case according to the 
Commission’s proposal, limits itself to providing internal advice within the Commission, this 




Box 1. European Commission proposal following up on the Five Presidents Report 
A SYSTEM OF NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS BOARDS  
"The creation by each euro area Member State of a national body in charge of tracking performance 
and policies in the field of competitiveness is recommended. This would help to prevent economic 
divergence and it would increase ownership of the necessary reforms at the national level. 
Tasks 
1. Track performance of competitiveness developments;  
2. Provide information and expertise to inform wage setting mechanisms, without setting 
wages or interfering with the role and powers of social partners;   
3. Monitor policies related to competitiveness and provide assessments of their effectiveness; 
4. Provide policy advice, taking into account the broader euro area and EU dimension; 
5. Inform the member states and the Commission throughout the European Semester and the 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP);  
6. Publish an annual report of their findings.  
AN ADVISORY EUROPEAN FISCAL BOARD 
"One of the main lessons of the crisis has been that fiscal policies are a matter of vital common interest 
in a Monetary Union. Even a strong Economic and Financial Union and a price stability-oriented 
common monetary policy are no guarantee for EMU to always function properly. (…) Responsible 
national fiscal policies are therefore essential." 
Tasks 
The European Fiscal Board will feed into the Commission's work of surveillance and enforcement 
of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). It will advise on the overall direction of fiscal policy of the 
euro area and evaluate how the fiscal governance framework was executed. The Board would 
neither replace national fiscal councils nor duplicate the Commission's work on applying the 
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5. The role of the president of the Eurogroup 
While rules-based governance plays a central role in the existing framework, the soft aspects 
of the new economic governance are often neglected. One of the essential functions of the 
European Semester is to create a “learning-by-doing loop”, where national policy-makers 
commit to achieve certain targets and learn to think, develop and implement their economic 
policies in a coordinated fashion. Thinking national economic policies as a part of a wider 
process should become a standardized, natural part of domestic policy making. This would, 
in turn, increase the probability of respecting the fiscal and economic targets. 
The experience seems to suggest that this has never really happened. Similarly, in the EU rule-
based system, there was the belief that peer pressure would push governments on the right 
track. 
Figure 9 highlights the moment during the semester cycle where peer pressure should come 
into play. 
Figure 9. Peer pressure in the European Semester 
 
Source: European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/m11_14.en.pdf 
Yet the 2010 legislative proposal to reinforce governance says little about the use of peer 
pressure as coordination instrument. In facts, this may be not surprising and possibly be the 
expression of the Commission’s frustration about the absence of peer pressure.  
In this perspective, both fiscal councils, which are supposed to provide independent analysis, 
assessment and forecasts, and the European Fiscal Board could fall under the framework of 
the peer pressure. Fiscal councils, with their independent estimates, forecast and assessments, 
could work as ‘domestic’ source of pressure on government. This may be perceived as more 
legitimate and likely than the one coming from other member states. 
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On the latter, it is clear that within the Council14 peer pressure does not work. One reason for 
this is the low incentive to name and shame those who do not comply with rules and 
recommendations and rather to collude with them, hoping in similar behaviour if necessary. 
Another possible explanation is the ‘small country syndrome’. Each individual country has 
little incentive to invest in the analytical capacity needed to make a meaningful contribution 
on the reforms programmes and the recommendations for other countries. The only country 
that has undertaken this investment seems to be Germany. The German Ministry of Finance 
has specialists who follow the economy of other member states closely enough to be able to 
form an independent opinion on what is needed in terms of reform. However, most other 
countries, especially the smaller ones, have either not shown interest or do not have the 
capacity to make a similar investment.  Why should every country have enough capacity to 
follow every other country? With 19 euro area member countries, the entire matrix contains 
over 240 bilateral combinations. It rather makes sense to reap economies of scale by 
centralising the analytical work in the Commission. But the downside is that the process of 
peer pressure cannot work when it comes to looking at the details of the CSRs and their 
implementation. 
As emphasized by Gros and Alcidi (2014) when it comes to the specific actions that the 
President of the Eurogroup could promote, there is little he can do to enforce action by member 
states, whether individually or collectively, but it could contribute to the implementation of 
the recommendations addressed to the euro area as a whole. 
Recommendations are formulated independently by the Commission, who has also the 
prerogative to propose sanctions. In principle, peer pressure is the only area where there is 
room for improvement. It remains to be seen whether in the future peer pressure can be more 
effective than in the past. 
6. Conclusion 
The recommendations dispensed in the context of the 2015 European Semester focussed in a 
more marked fashion, compared to previous year, on structural reforms. While structural 
reforms are in general welcome, we find that they are often poorly defined. Economists and 
policy makers disagree under which conditions which reforms work, and reforms take time 
to deliver. In the context of the EU governance the additional complication comes from the 
fact that the rationale at EU level for such reforms is weak in normal times and the Commission 
and the Council have no concrete tool to ensure the enforcement. 
In the current institutional framework the only coordination instrument that could be boosted 
is peer pressure across member states, but also coming from other level (e.g. domestic). In the 
past this has not worked and it should be considered that additional peer pressure could come 
at the cost of complicating even further the existing governance system. 
  
                                                   
14 In the framework of the open method of coordination peer pressure has an explicit role. “[It] may 
provoke member states into action when they would not have acted on these issues of their own accord. 
The role of the European Parliament in this process is seen to be very limited and mostly confined to 
giving advice, while the Commission's role is limited as well to mere monitoring and surveillance”. 
www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-AaG-542142-Open-Method-of-Coordination-FINAL.pdf 
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Annex 
Germany – recommendations on Service sector 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
CSRs on Service sector competition 
Remove unjustified restrictions on 
certain professional services and on 
certain crafts. To improve 
competition in network industries, 
strengthen the supervisory role of 
the Federal Network Agency in the 
rail sector; and, in the context of the 
announced national Energy 
Concept, focus on improving the 
long-term cost-effectiveness of the 
Renewable Energy Act, ensuring 
the effective independence of 
energy production and 
transmission, and improving cross- 
border 
Continue efforts to keep the 
overall economic costs of 
transforming the energy system to 
a minimum, including by 
accelerating the expansion of the 
national and cross-border 
electricity and gas networks. 
Ensure that the institutional set-
up guarantees effective 
competition in railway markets. 
Take measures to further stimulate 
competition in the services sectors, 
including professional services and 
certain crafts, in particular in the 
construction sector. 
Take measures to further stimulate 
competition in the services sectors, including 
certain crafts — in the construction sector in 
particular — and professional services to 
boost domestic sources of growth. Take 
urgent action to significantly increase the 
value of public contracts open to 
procurement. Adopt and implement the 
announced legislative reform to improve the 
enforcement of competition law regarding 
competition restrictions. Remove planning 
restrictions which unduly restrict new entries 
in the retail sector. Take further measures to 
eliminate barriers to competition in the 
railway markets. Pursue efforts for 
consolidation in the banking sector, including 
by improving the governance framework. 
Take more ambitious measures to 
further stimulate competition in the 
services sector, including certain 
professional services, also by reviewing 
existing regulatory approaches and 
converging towards best practices across 
Länder. Identify the reasons behind the 
low value of public contracts open to 
procurement under EU legislation. 
Increase efforts to remove unjustified 
planning regulations which restrict new 
entries in the retail sector. Take action to 
remove the remaining barriers to 
competition in the railway markets. 
Pursue consolidation efforts in the 
Landesbanken sector, including by 
improving the governance framework. 
Take more ambitious measures to 
stimulate competition in the 
services sector, in particular in 
professional services, by 
eliminating unjustified restrictions 
such as legal form and 
shareholding requirements and 
fixed tariffs. To this end, conclude 
the ongoing domestic review of 
these barriers and take follow-up 
measures. Remove the remaining 
barriers to competition in the 
railway markets, in particular in 
long-distance rail passenger 
transport. 
 EC Assessment Insufficient progress in 
minimising the costs of 
transforming the energy system. 
Some progress in setting the 
conditions for accelerating the 
expansion of the networks. 
Limited progress in ensuring 
competition in the railway markets. 
Limited progress in stimulating 
competition in the service sectors. 
Limited Progress:  
Limited progress in taking measures to 
further stimulate competition in the service 
sector. Germany has undertaken isolated 
reforms in specific professions and regions.  
Limited progress in increasing the value of 
public contracts open to procurement. Steps 
in the right direction, including the 
development of a database on procurement 
procedures. Full implementation of 
improved enforcement of competition law as 
regards competition restrictions. The revised 
Act against Competition Restrictions came 
into force in 2013. No progress in removing 
planning regulations that unduly restrict new 
entries in the retail sector. Limited progress 
in taking measures to eliminate barriers to 
competition in the railway markets. No 
significant steps to improve competition in 
the railway markets. The NRP announces the 
Limited Progress:  
Limited progress as regards stimulating 
competition in the services sector. 
Germany is participating in the mutual 
evaluation exercise provided for in the 
Directive amending the Professional 
Qualifications Directive. However, no 
major changes can be expected before 
the end of that exercise or before the 
deadline for submission of the national 
action plan. On legal form and 
shareholding restrictions, limited 
changes are underway in some federal 
states, but there is still no broad review 
of such restrictions. Limited progress in 
identifying the reasons behind the low 
value of public contracts open to 
procurement under EU legislation. The 
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs 
and Energy presented an interim report 
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transposition of European legislation into 
national law.  
Limited progress in pursuing efforts for 
consolidation in the banking sector, including 
by improving the governance framework. 
While Commission state-aid decisions have 
driven the restructuring of Landesbanken, no 
major measures have been taken to address 
possible impediments to market-driven 
consolidation in the public banking sector. 
of a statistical study aimed to build a 
statistical database. No progress as 
regards restrictions in retail.  
Limited progress in improving 
competition in the railway markets. 
Germany has announced the 
preparation of a new proposal to 
transpose Directive 2012/34/EU in 
2015). The federal government and 
Deutsche Bahn AG have signed a new 
infrastructure financing agreement. No 
progress in pursuing consolidation 
efforts in the Landesbanken sector. 
 
Italy: CSRs on labour market, Services and Taxation 
CSRs Labour market 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Reinforce measures to combat 
segmentation in the labour market, 
also by reviewing selected aspects of 
employment protection legislation 
including the dismissal rules and 
procedures and reviewing the 
currently fragmented unemployment 
benefit system taking into account the 
budgetary constraints. Step up efforts 
to fight undeclared work. In addition, 
take steps to promote greater 
participation of women in the labour 
market, by increasing the availability 
of care facilities throughout the 
country and providing financial 
incentives to second earners to take up 
work in a budgetary neutral way. 
Adopt the labour market reform as a 
priority to tackle the segmentation of 
the labour market and establish an 
integrated unemployment benefit 
scheme. Take further action to 
incentivise labour market 
participation of women, in particular 
through the provision of childcare and 
elderly care. Monitor and if needed 
reinforce the implementation of the 
new wage setting framework in order 
to contribute to the alignment of wage 
growth and productivity at sector and 
company level.  
Ensure the effective implementation 
of the labour market and wage setting 
reforms to allow better alignment of 
wages to productivity. Take further 
action to foster labour market 
participation, especially of women and 
young people, for example through a 
Youth Guarantee. Strengthen 
vocational education and training, 
ensure more efficient public 
employment services and improve 
career and counselling services for 
tertiary students. Reduce financial 
disincentives for second earners to 
work and improve the provision of 
care, especially child- and long-term 
care, and out-of-school services. Step 
up efforts to prevent early school 
leaving. Improve school quality and 
outcomes, also by enhancing teachers' 
professional development and 
diversifying career development. 
Ensure effectiveness of social transfers, 
Evaluate, by the end of 2014, the 
impact of the labour market and 
wage-setting reforms on job creation, 
dismissals' procedures, labour 
market duality and cost 
competitiveness, and assess the need 
for additional action. Work towards a 
more comprehensive social protection 
for the unemployed, while limiting 
the use of wage supplementation 
schemes to facilitate labour re-
allocation. Strengthen the link 
between active and passive labour 
market policies, starting with a 
detailed roadmap for action by 
December 2014, and reinforce the 
coordination and performance of 
public employment services across the 
country. Adopt effective action to 
promote female employment, by 
adopting measures to reduce fiscal 
disincentives for second earners by 
March 2015 and providing adequate 
Adopt the legislative decrees on the 
design and use of wage 
supplementation schemes, the 
revision of contractual arrangements, 
work-life balance and the 
strengthening of active labour 
market policies. Promote, in 
consultation with the social partners 
and in accordance with national 
practices, an effective framework for 
second-level contractual bargaining. 
As part of efforts to tackle youth 
unemployment, adopt and implement 
the planned school reform and expand 
vocationally oriented tertiary 
education. 
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notably through better targeting of 
benefits, especially for low-income 
households with children. 
care services. Provide adequate 
services across the country to 
nonregistered young people and 
ensure stronger private sector 
commitment to offering quality 
apprenticeships and traineeships by 
the end of 2014, in line with the 
objectives of a youth guarantee. To 
address exposure to poverty and 
social exclusion, scale-up the new 
pilot social assistance scheme, in 
compliance with budgetary targets, 
guaranteeing appropriate targeting, 
strict conditionality and territorial 
uniformity, and strengthening the link 
with activation measures. Improve 
the effectiveness of family support 
schemes and quality services 
favouring low-income households 
with children. 
EC Assessment Some progress In line with the CSR, 
an ambitious reform of the labour 
market was adopted in June 2012, but 
still requires the adoption of 
implementing decrees for some of its 
provisions. Although measures were 
adopted to encourage female 
participation in the labour market, 
their scope remains narrow. 
Furthermore, the measures regarding 
the provision of childcare and elderly 
care remain at a general stage and 
have limited scope. On wage 
bargaining, an agreement was signed 
by the social partners in 2012. It 
promotes decentralised bargaining 
and acknowledges the need to link 
wages not only to inflation but also to 
the economic and competitive 
conditions of the country of the sector 
concerned. 
Limited Progress:  
Some progress in implementing the 
labour market and wage-setting 
reforms. Most implementing 
legislation of the 2012 labour market 
reforms has been adopted. The March 
2014 decree law further simplifies the 
regulation of fixed-term and 
apprenticeship contracts. Criteria for 
representativeness in collective 
bargaining were set in January 2014, 
which may foster decentralisation of 
bargaining. The measures to upgrade 
public employment services however 
still need to be implemented and the 
effectiveness of active labour market 
policies remains low. The national 
reform programme announces further 
measures as regards to contractual 
simplification, the reform of 
unemployment benefits and the 
systematisation of active labour 
market policy. Limited progress has 
Some Progress:  
Some progress was made to reduce 
segmentation, increase exit flexibility, 
reform passive and active labour 
market policies and foster 
participation. A broad-ranging 
enabling law for reforming the labour 
market was adopted in December 
2014, with two important legislative 
implementing decrees on 
employment protection and the 
revision of unemployment benefits 
being already adopted and two, 
respectively on labour contracts and 
work-life balance, subject to the non-
binding opinion of the Parliament. 
Other implementing legislative 
decrees (on active labour market 
policies, review of wage-
supplementation schemes and 
inspections) are expected to follow 
before June 2015.  
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been made in addressing youth 
unemployment. Some measures were 
taken but their scope and the resources 
allocated are limited. The Youth 
Guarantee Implementation Plan is 
being examined by the Commission. 
Limited progress on women’s labour 
market participation, with regard to 
both childcare and long-term care and 
disincentives to work for second 
earners. Some measures to reduce 
disincentives to work for 
secondearners and foster parenthood 
are included in an enabling law 
adopted by the government in April 
2014. Some progress on the 
effectiveness of social transfers. A 
‘social inclusion card’ pilot project 
targeted to low income households 
with children is in place and is planned 
to be extended to the whole territory. 
Limited progress on education. 
Measures have been taken on career 
guidance and early school leaving. 
Initiatives to strengthen vocational 
education and training are of limited 
scope and impact. The issue of 
enhancing the teaching profession 
remains largely unaddressed. 
Limited progress was made on youth 
unemployment. The implementation 
of the Youth Guarantee started in May 
2014 but take-up is limited. 
Limited progress was made to 
address exposure to poverty. A pilot 
project on the social inclusion scheme 
(SIA) has been carried out in 12 
metropolitan cities. Under the labour 
market reform, an unemployment 
assistance scheme is being established 
(ASDI). 
CSRs Service sector and business environment 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Extend the process of opening up the 
services sector to further competition, 
including in the field of professional 
services. Adopt in 2011 the Annual 
Law on Competition, taking into 
account the recommendations 
presented by the Antitrust Authority. 
Reduce the length of contract law 
enforcement procedures. Further 
strengthen actions to promote the 
access of SMEs to capital markets by 
Implement the adopted liberalisation 
and simplification measures in the 
services sector. Take further measures 
to improve market access in network 
industries, as well as infrastructure 
capacity and interconnections. 
Simplify further the regulatory 
framework for businesses and 
enhance administrative capacity. 
Improve access to financial 
instruments, in particular equity, to 
Ensure the proper implementation of 
the measures aiming at market 
opening in the services sector. Remove 
remaining restrictions in professional 
services and foster market access for 
instance in the provision of local public 
services where the use of public 
procurement should be advanced 
(instead of direct concessions). Pursue 
deployment of the measures taken to 
improve market access conditions in 
Approve the pending legislation or 
other equivalent measures aimed at 
simplifying the regulatory 
environment for businesses and 
citizens and address implementation 
gaps in existing legislation. Foster 
market opening and remove 
remaining barriers to, and restrictions 
on, competition in the professional 
and local public services, insurance, 
fuel distribution, retail and postal 
Implement the simplification agenda 
for 2015-17 to ease the administrative 
and regulatory burden. Adopt 
competition-enhancing measures in 
all the sectors covered by the 
competition law, and take decisive 
action to remove remaining barriers. 
Ensure that local public services 
contracts not complying with the 
requirements on in-house awards are 
rectified by no later than end-2015. 
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removing regulatory obstacles and 
reducing costs. 
finance growing businesses and 
innovation. Implement the planned 
reorganisation of the civil justice 
system, and promote the use of 
alternative dispute settlement 
mechanisms. 
network industries, in particular by 
setting- up the Transport Authority as 
a priority. Upgrade infrastructure 
capacity with focus on energy 
interconnections, intermodal transport 
and high-speed broadband in 
telecommunications, also with a view 
to tackling the North-South 
disparities. 
services sectors. Enhance the 
efficiency of public procurement, 
especially by streamlining procedures 
including through the better use of 
eProcurement, rationalising the 
central purchasing bodies and 
securing the proper application of pre- 
and post-award rules. In local public 
services, rigorously implement the 
legislation providing for the 
rectification of contracts that do not 
comply with the requirements on in-
house awards by 31 December 2014. 
EC Assessment Some progress: Important measures 
have been adopted to improve market 
functioning in services and network 
industries. Yet, risks can be identified 
as regards the proper implementation 
of some of them, the liberalisation of 
local public services halted, and areas 
for further action remain, for instance 
in fuel distribution, insurance, and 
postal services. Besides, only limited 
progress has been registered 
regarding the improvement of 
infrastructure in the electricity and gas 
sectors. Work on administrative 
simplification has continued. 
However, the draft law on 
simplification expected to supplement 
this effort has not been approved by 
the Italian Parliament. Several tools 
were introduced to ease firms’ access 
to finance and improve research and 
innovation, but remain limited in 
scope. 
Limited progress:  
Limited progress in fostering market 
access in services. Some efforts have 
been made to open up and modernise 
the services sector, particularly a 
reform of professional associations 
(implementation is proceeding, with 
some challenges for the legal 
profession). However as stressed by 
the Italian Competition Authority, the 
issue of procurement and provision of 
local public services remains high on 
the agenda and needs to be addressed.  
Substantial progress in improving 
market access conditions in energy; 
Limited Progress:  
Some progress was made simplify the 
regulatory environment for business 
and citizens. The government has 
adopted the ‘Simplification Agenda 
for 2015-17’ to foster cooperation 
between central and regional 
governments in establishing a more 
coherent simplification framework 
and measures have been taken to 
simplify authorisation procedures in 
environmental and construction 
matters.  
Limited progress was made in 
improving public procurement. 
Measures to rationalise public 
procurement have taken and a draft 
enabling law for the reform of the 
public procurement code was tabled 
government. 
 No progress was made to reform 
local public services. The deadline of 
end-2014 for rectifying contracts that 
do not comply with EU law has been 
postponed to end-2015. The 
observatory that is supposed to 
oversee the implementation of 
relevant legislation is not yet 
operational. The draft enabling law 
for the reform of the public 
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administration includes measures to 
reform local public services.  
Limited progress was made to 
address restrictions on competition in 
other sectors, for which a ‘law for 
competition’ has been announced. In 
the banking sector, the regulation 
concerning the portability of bank 
accounts was improved. The rental 
market for non-residential large 
buildings was opened. Italy is actively 
participating in the mutual evaluation 
exercise provided for in the Directive 
amending the Professional 
Qualifications Directive but has yet to 
complete its review. 
CSRs Tax evasion and taxation of productive factors 
2011 2012 2013 2014  
 Pursue the fight against tax evasion. 
Pursue the shadow economy and 
undeclared work, for instance by 
stepping up checks and controls. Take 
measures to reduce the scope of tax 
exemptions, allowances and reduced 
VAT rates and simplify the tax code. 
Take further action to shift the tax 
burden away from capital and labour 
to property and consumption as well 
as environment. 
Shift the tax burden from labour and 
capital to consumption, property and 
the environment in a budgetary 
neutral manner. To this purpose, 
review the scope of VAT exemptions 
and reduced rates and of direct tax 
expenditures, and reform the cadastral 
system to align the tax base of 
recurrent immovable property to 
market values. Pursue the fight 
against tax evasion, improve tax 
compliance and take decisive steps 
against the shadow economy and 
undeclared work. 
 
Further shift the tax burden from 
productive factors to consumption, 
property and the environment, in 
compliance with the budgetary 
targets. To this end, evaluate the 
effectiveness of the recent reduction in 
the labour tax wedge and ensure its 
financing for 2015, review the scope of 
direct tax expenditures and broaden 
the tax base, in particular on 
consumption. Ensure more effective 
environmental taxation, including in 
the area of excise duties, and remove 
environmentally harmful subsidies. 
Implement the enabling law for tax 
reform by March 2015, including by 
adopting the decrees leading to the 
reform of the cadastral system to 
ensure the effectiveness of the reform 
of immovable property taxation. 
Further improve tax compliance by 
enhancing the predictability of the tax 
system, simplifying procedures, 
improving tax debt recovery and 
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modernising tax administration. 
Pursue the fight against tax evasion 
and take additional steps against the 
shadow economy and undeclared 
work 
EC Assessment Limited progress After the ambitious 
measures adopted over 2010- 11, 
progress towards further shifting the 
tax burden from labour and capital to 
property and consumption has been 
limited. Relevant measures were 
contained in a draft enabling law for 
reforming the tax system to improve 
tax compliance, simplify the tax 
system and enhance its efficiency but 
remained at the stage of projects since 
the law has not been adopted by the 
Italian Parliament. Italy has 
implemented targeted measures to 
enhance the tools available to the tax 
administration to efficiently tackle tax 
evasion. 
Limited Progress:  
Some progress in shifting the tax 
burden away from productive factors. 
The 2014 Stability Law decreased the 
tax burden on labour and further 
measures were taken in April 2014 to 
reduce the tax wedge, but fully 
financed only for 2014. The standard 
rate of VAT was raised but VAT 
exemptions and reduced rates have 
not been reviewed. Furthermore there 
has been no structural reform of direct 
tax expenditure and cadastral values 
have not been updated to reflect real 
market values (an enabling law to 
these purposes was adopted in March 
2014).  
Limited progress to reform taxation, 
improve tax compliance and reducing 
tax evasion. The government has 
undertaken additional enforcement 
measures but decisive action to 
improve tax compliance and reduce 
tax evasion is missing. The March 
enabling law on taxation includes 
measures that, once implemented, 
could represent a significant step 
forward. Progress on reducing the 
shadow economy and undeclared 
work has been limited. 
Some Progress:  
Some progress was made in shifting 
taxation away from labour. A tax 
credit (of EUR 10 billion or 0.6% of 
GDP per year) was introduced for 
lowincome earners in April 2014 and 
the labour component was excluded 
from the calculation of the regional 
business tax (IRAP) from Jan 2015. For 
new hires under open-ended contracts 
in 2015, private sector employers will 
not pay social security contributions 
for three years. Limited progress was 
made on tax expenditures, 
environmental taxation, and removal 
of environmentally harmful subsidies. 
Some progress was made to simplify 
procedures (including pre-filled tax 
returns) and improve compliance 
(including measures to prevent 
carousel fraud in VAT and facilitate 
voluntary disclosure). A report on tax 
evasion was published in October 




CSRs Euro Area 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Strictly adhere to the budgetary 
targets set out in their 2011 Stability 
Programmes as well as the 
Memoranda of Understanding in 
Strengthen the working methods of 
the Eurogroup to allow it to take 
responsibility for the aggregate policy 
stance in the euro area, effectively 
Take responsibility for the aggregate 
policy stance in the euro area in order 
to ensure the good functioning of the 
euro area to increase growth and 
Take forward work on deepening 
Economic and Monetary Union and 
contribute to the improvement of the 
economic surveillance framework in 
Use peer pressure to promote 
structural reforms that facilitate the 
correction of large internal and 
external debts and support 
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Member States receiving EU/IMF 
financial assistance and, where 
applicable, reinforce consolidation 
efforts in line with the opinion 
delivered by the Council. In 
particular, ensure adequate fiscal 
efforts with a view to correcting 
excessive deficits and approaching 
medium-term budgetary objectives. 
Use any fiscal windfalls to accelerate 
adjustment. This should also help to 
improve public debt dynamics. 
responding to changes in the 
economic environment, and to lead 
the coordination of economic policy in 
the context of the strengthened 
surveillance framework which applies 
to the euro area member states. 
employment, and to take forward the 
work on deepening Economic and 
Monetary Union. Allow the 
Eurogroup to play a central role in the 
strengthened surveillance framework 
applicable to euro area member states 
to coordinate and monitor reforms at 
national and at the euro area level that 
are necessary for a stable and robust 
euro area and to ensure policy 
coherence, and in the preparation of 
the Euro Summits. 
the context of the reviews foreseen for 
end 2014. 
investment. Regularly assess the 
delivery of reforms in those member 
states which require specific 
monitoring within the framework of 
the Macroeconomic Imbalances 
Procedure. Continue the regular 
thematic assessment of structural 
reforms. By spring 2016, take decisions 
on the follow-up to the coordination 
exercise on reducing the high tax 
wedge on labour and on reforming 
services markets. 
Ensure fiscal discipline at both 
national and sub-national levels, 
notably by introducing or reinforcing 
sufficiently strong and binding fiscal 
frameworks. 
Intensify policy cooperation in the 
Eurogroup by sharing information 
and discussing budgetary plans and 
the plans of major reforms with 
potential spillovers effects on the euro 
area. Ensure that such reforms are 
undertaken that are necessary for a 
stable and robust euro area, including 
the implementation of the 
recommendations which the Council 
has addressed to individual euro area 
member states and which, in addition 
to addressing challenges at national 
level, have an impact on the euro area 
as a whole. 
Ensure that the Eurogroup monitors 
and coordinates fiscal policies of the 
euro area member states and the 
aggregate fiscal stance for the euro 
area as a whole to ensure a growth 
friendly and differentiated fiscal 
policy. To this end the Eurogroup 
should discuss the Commission 
opinions of the draft budgetary plans 
of each of the euro area member states, 
and the budgetary situation and 
prospects for the euro area as a whole 
on the basis of the overall assessment 
by the Commission of the draft 
budgetary plans and their interaction. 
The coordination shall contribute to 
ensuring that the pace of fiscal 
consolidation is differentiated 
according to the fiscal and economic 
situation of the euro area member 
states with the budgetary adjustment 
defined in structural terms in line with 
the Stability and Growth Pact, 
allowing the automatic stabilisers to 
function along the adjustment path 
and that, in view of reinforcing the 
credibility of fiscal policy over the 
medium term, fiscal consolidation is 
supported by an overall efficient and 
growth-friendly mix of expenditure 
and revenue and by appropriate 
Coordinate fiscal policies of the euro 
area member states, in close 
cooperation with the Commission, in 
particular when assessing draft 
budgetary plans to ensure a coherent 
and growth-friendly fiscal stance 
across the euro area. Improve the 
quality and sustainability of public 
finances by prioritising material and 
immaterial investment at national and 
EU levels. Ensure that national fiscal 
frameworks, including national fiscal 
councils, are strong. 
Coordinate fiscal policies to ensure 
that the aggregate euro area fiscal 
stance is in line with sustainability 
risks and cyclical conditions. This is 
without prejudice to the fulfilment of 
the requirements of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. By spring 2016, hold 
thematic discussions on 
improvements in the quality and 
sustainability of public finances, 
focussing in particular on the 
prioritisation of tangible and 
intangible investment at national and 
EU levels, and on making tax systems 
more growth friendly. Monitor the 
effective functioning of the recently 
strengthened national fiscal 
frameworks. 
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structural reforms which enhance the 
economic growth potential. 
Continue to implement reforms to 
social security systems that ensure 
fiscal sustainability with due regard to 
the adequacy of pensions and social 
benefits, notably by aligning pension 
systems with the national 
demographic situation. 
Strengthen fiscal discipline and fiscal 
institutions at both national and 
subnational levels to enhance market 
confidence in the medium and long-
term sustainability of public finances 
in the euro area. Following the 
agreement by the euro area Heads of 
State or Government in July and 
October 2011 and on 2 March 2012, 
advance the transposition of Directive 
2011/85/EU to the end of 2012 and 
strengthen fiscal governance further, 
in particular by introducing in the 
national legislation of all euro area 
member states the rules for balanced 
budget in structural terms and the 
automatic correction mechanisms. 
Assess, in the framework of the 
Eurogroup, the reasons behind the 
differences in lending rates especially 
to SMEs across the euro area member 
states; explore the consequences of the 
fragmentation of the financial markets 
in the euro area and contribute to ways 
to overcome it. 
Ensure the resilience of the banking 
system, in particular by taking the 
necessary action in the follow up of 
the asset quality review and the stress 
tests, and by implementing the 
Banking Union regulations and taking 
forward the further work foreseen in 
the SRM transition period. Stimulate 
private sector investment and increase 
the flow of credit to the economy via 
actions to improve access to credit by 
SMEs, deepening of capital markets, 
restarting the securitisation market, 
based on the proposals and the 
calendar in the Commission 
Communication on longterm 
financing of the European economy. 
Ensure the timely finalisation of the 
follow up of the Comprehensive 
Assessment carried out by the 
European Central Bank, 
implementation of Directive 
2014/59/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council ( 1 ) 
(Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive), completion of the 
ratification of the Intergovernmental 
Agreement on the Single Resolution 
Fund and make the Fund fully 
operational as from January 2016. 
Promote measures to deepen 
marketbased finance, to improve 
access to finance for SMEs and to 
develop alternative sources of finance. 
Encourage further reforms of national 
insolvency frameworks. 
Improve the functioning and stability 
of the financial system, following up 
immediately on the forthcoming EU-
wide stress tests to ensure that the 
banking sector continues to 
strengthen its resilience to possible 
further losses or funding constraints 
and that non-viable financial 
institutions are able to restructure or 
exit the market without creating 
undue tensions on financial markets. 
Based on the European Council 
Conclusions of 1-2 March 2012, ensure 
a coherent aggregate fiscal stance in 
the euro area by pursuing fiscal 
consolidation as set out in Council 
recommendations and decisions, in 
line with the rules of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, which take into account 
the country-specific macro-financial 
situations. Member states affected by 
significant and potentially rising risk 
premia should limit deviations from 
the nominal balance targets even 
against worse-than-expected 
macroeconomic conditions; other 
member states should let the 
automatic stabilisers play along the 
adjustment path assessed in structural 
terms and stand ready to review the 
pace of consolidation should 
macroeconomic conditions deteriorate 
further. Composition of government 
Building on the recapitalisation and 
the restructuring of the past years, 
promote further balance-sheet repair 
among banks as a means to reverse 
fragmentation in the single market and 
improve the flow of credit to the real 
economy, particularly SMEs. To this 
end: (a) ensure that the balance sheet 
assessments and stress tests to be 
conducted by the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) in cooperation with 
the European Banking Authority 
(EBA) are concluded in accordance 
with the agreed timeline; (b) ensure a 
level playing field in applying burden-
sharing requirements in the 
recapitalisation of banks; (c) ensure the 
availability of credible fiscal backstops 
in the context of balance sheet 
assessments and stress tests; (d) 
remove supervisory incentives for 
banks to match asset and liabilities 
Promote and monitor, in close 
cooperation with the Commission, the 
implementation of structural reforms 
in those areas most relevant for the 
smooth functioning of the euro area in 
order to foster growth and 
convergence and adjustment of 
internal and external imbalances. 
Assess and stimulate progress in 
delivering on reform commitments in 
euro area member states experiencing 
excessive imbalances and in reform 
implementation in the euro area 
member states with imbalances 
requiring decisive action, to limit 
negative spillovers to the rest of the 
euro area. Foster appropriate policies 
in countries with large current 
account surpluses to contribute to 
positive spillovers. Regularly hold 
thematic discussions on structural 
reforms in the labour and product 
Take forward work on deepening 
Economic and Monetary Union, and 
contribute to the improvement of the 
economic surveillance framework in 
the context of the report on the next 
steps on better economic governance 
in the euro area, prepared by the 
President of the European 
Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, in 
close cooperation with the President of 
the European Council, Donald Tusk, 
the President of the European 
Parliament, Martin Schulz, the 
President of the European Central 
Bank, Mario Draghi, and the President 
of the Eurogroup, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, 
and its follow-up. 
ECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION IN THE EURO AREA UNDER THE EUROPEAN SEMESTER | 25 
 
expenditure and revenues should 
reflect the growth impact of spending 
items and revenue sources. In 
particular, all the available budgetary 
margins should be used to foster 
public investment in the euro area, 
including by taking into account 
cross-country differences in the cost of 
funding. 
within national borders; and (e) 
accelerate the necessary steps to 
establish the Banking Union, as 
outlined by the European Council. 
markets with potentially large 
spillovers, focussing on reducing the 
high tax wedge on labour and 
reforming services markets. 
Pursue further tax reforms which give 
priority to growth- friendly sources of 
taxation while preserving overall tax 
revenues, in particular by lowering 
taxes on labour to make work pay; 
when reducing public expenditure, 
protect growth-enhancing items such 
as spending on research and 
development, education and energy 
efficiency; where necessary adjust 
wage setting arrangements and 
indexation mechanisms, in 
consultation with social partners and 
in accordance with national practices, 
so as to ensure that wages are evolving 
in line with productivity, 
competitiveness and the employment 
situation. 
Take action to improve the 
functioning and stability of the 
financial system in the euro area. 
Accelerate the steps towards a more 
integrated financial architecture, 
comprising banking supervision and 
crossborder crisis resolution. 
Coordinate ex ante the major economic 
reform plans of the member states 
whose currency is the euro. Monitor 
the implementation of structural 
reforms, notably in the labour and 
product markets and assess their 
impact on the euro area, taking into 
account the Council recommendations 
to individual euro area member states. 
Promote further adjustment in the 
euro area, ensuring a correction of 
external and internal imbalances, inter 
alia by following thoroughly the 
reforms that address distortions to 
saving and investment behaviour in 
member states with both current 
account deficits and surpluses. Take 
the necessary steps for an effective 
implementation of the Macroeconomic 
Imbalances Procedure, notably by 
assessing progress in reform 
commitments in member states 
experiencing excessive imbalances and 
in reform implementation in member 
states with imbalances requiring 
decisive action to limit negative 
spillovers to the rest of the euro area. 
  
Introduce further reforms to enhance 
competition in service sectors, in 
particular by removing unjustified 
restrictions on professional services, 
retailing and network industries. 
Implement structural reforms, which 
also promote flexible wage 
adjustments, and which — together 
with a differentiated fiscal stance — 
would promote an orderly unwinding 
of intraeuro area macroeconomic 
imbalances and thus growth and jobs. 
In line with the AGS 2013, it is crucial 
for the euro area member states to take 
collective and significant measures in 
order to tackle the social consequences 
of the crisis and the rising 
unemployment levels. The situation of 
unemployed young people is 
  
26 | GROS & ALCIDI 
 
This would include action at national 
level which reflects the country-
specific situation and takes account of 
the Council recommendations to 
individual euro area member states. 
particularly worrying and bold action 
is recommended along the lines of the 
Compact for Growth and jobs and the 
EU Youth Guarantee. Further reforms 
to facilitate access to employment, 
prevent early withdrawals from the 
labour market, reduce the cost of 
labour, combat labour market 
segmentation and support innovation 
are recommended. 
Fully implement the commitments 
made in the Euro Plus Pact so as to 
enhance growth, competitiveness and 
employment within the area. 
    
 
